Circuit Court of Appeals to find out from appellate judges themselves when they disqualify, particularly in situations which may not be reflected in cases or statutes. The information obtained from the Inquiry is utilized in sections of this article, but in order that the reports of the thirty-nine participating state and federal courts may speak for themselves, the totals on various points are included in an appendix.
The subject of judicial disqualification is one of consequence considerably broader than the superficial question of whether Mr. Justice Jacksori is a patriot among sinners, as some imply, or a fool among wise men, as his critics may contend. 5 The Jackson charge raises a substantial issue of whether judges should disqualify themselves in cases presented by former partners. There is no statute governing disqualification of federal appellate judges, and the various Circuit Courts of Appeal judges must decide whether to follow Black's practice or Jackson's recommendation. State judges, too, to the extent that they are not governed by statute, must make the same decision. The federal district judges also must face the problem, for under the statute governing the details. Notes and comments in legal periodicals will be cited for the reader who may desire detail on a particular point, and cases and statutes selected for citation are chosen either because they are typical or unusual, and not for the sake of completeness. The subject of waiver of disqualification will not be treated beyond this notation that the views on waiver are divided into three: that disqualification is generally waivable, that it is never waivable because it is jurisdictional, and that it is wivaible as to some grounds and not others. For examples of the latter view, see Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 562, 6 P. 5. The following instances typify the press reaction to the Jackson charges: David Lawrence expressed gratitude that Jackson had the courage to "expose the irregular situation," N. Y. Sun, June 17, 1946, p. 17, col. 1. On the other hand the Macon, Ga. News, June 17, 1946, took the position that "Justice Jackson is an ass." In an editorial thus headed the News said: "Mr. Justice Black . . . has done no wrong and has been guilty of no impropriety in the particular case, except in the perverted imagination of a disappointed aspirant for the post of Chief Justice. .. ." The extremely conservative Republican press took the opportunity to say "A plague on both your houses"; see, e.g., Chicago Tribune editorial, June 12, 1946. A substantial minority of the more temperate press took the view that it did not know when judges should and when they should not disqualify and therefore remained neutral; see, e.g., editorial Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 12,1946. their conduct they may be required to decide whether hearing an expartner will constitute "prejudice" within the law. 6 But the enormous body of disqualification law I raises many questions quite removed from the extremely unusual ex-partner issue. While disqualification only occasionally attracts widespread public attention-as it did early in this century in Montana 8 and very recently in Delaware-it is much before the courts and legislatures. Each state has some statutory or constitutional law on the subject, but all shadings of view on particular grounds for disqualification are discovered. The traditional grounds of disqualification for interest, for relationship, or for bias, set a general framework for most states; but within that framework there is room for wide variety.
The divergencies stem from two fundamentally different policies which govern the field. All courts want justice done, but the conflict of values comes over method: if disqualification of judges is too easy, both the cost and the delay of justice go out of bounds. If disqualification is too hard, cases may be decided quickly, but unfairly. Nowhere is that conflict of values more glaring than in the United States Supreme Court, where the cases are usually important. If a justice sits who should not, great interests may be jeopardized; but if a justice disqualifies who should not, vital questions may be needlessly left without authoritative decision. For under existing law, there is no procedure for replacing a disqualified justice of the Supreme Court even [Vol. 56: 605 when his non-participation deprives the litigants of the statutory quorum necessary for decision. 9 The polar views are expressed thus: By New Mexico, an "easy" disqualification state: "Our Legislature in effect has said that a judge, even though blessed with all of the virtues any judge ever possessed, shall not be permitted to exercise judicial power to determine the fact of his own disqualifications, not because the judge in doing so would attempt to act otherwise than conscientiously, but because in their legislative judgment it is not fitting for him to make such an attempt, and it is better that the courts shall maintain the confidence of the people than that the rights of judge and litigant in a particular case be served." 10 By Pennsylvania, a "hard" disqualification state:
"Due consideration should be given by him [the judge] to the fact that the administration of justice should be beyond the appearance of unfairness. But while the mediation of courts is based upon the principal of judicial impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness pervading the whole system of judicature, so that courts may as near as possible be above suspicion, there is, on the other side, an important issue at stake; that is, that causes may not be unfairly prejudiced, unduly delayed, or discontent created through unfounded charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge in the trial of a cause." 11
The cases and statutes reflect, as might be expected, a mixture of these two views. All jurisdictions have some disqualifications 12 and all draw a line where they believe the privilege of disqualification may be abused.
ORIGINS
The common law of disqualification, unlike the civil law, was clear and simple: a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else. Although Bracton tried unsuccessfully to incorporate into English law the view that mere "suspicion" by a party was a basis for disqualification, 13 it was Coke who, with reference to cases in which the judge's pocketbook was involved, set the standards for his time in his injunction that "no man shall be a judge in his own case." 11 Blackstone rejected absolutely the possibility that a judge might be disqualified for bias as distinguished from interest. "
Pecuniary interest took many forms. A judge might be disqualified, as in Dr. Bonham's Case, 6 because he received the fine which he had the power to inflict; and the Mayor of Hertford" 7 was "layed by the heels" for sitting as judge in an ejectment case in which he was lessor of the plaintiff. A similar charge of interest arose where the judge's status as citizen and taxpayer of a unit of society might be affected by his decision. Thus, for example, in a case involving a pauper, a judge was disqualified for interest because the decision affected his taxes."' 13. "Causa vero recusationis unica est, scilicet suspicio, quae consurgit multis ex causis, scilicet si iustitiarius sit consanguineus petentis, homo vel subditus, parens vel amicus, vel inimicus tenentis, affinis, familiaris vel commensalis, consiliarius, vel narrator suus extiterit in causa ilia vel alia ex huiusmodi." 4 BRACTON, DELEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINInUS ANGLIAE (Woodbine's ed. 1942) 281. Bracton's views as thus expressed are close to the most advanced modern practice; a judge should disqualify, says Bracton, if he is related to a party, if he is hostile to a party, if he has been counsel in the case. However his inclusion of the phrases "amicus" and "consiliarius . . . in causa ilia vel alla," if it refers to a judge-party relationship as we know it, is not present practice; that is, judges very rarely disqualify because a party is a friend or because they were counsel for a party in a different case. Both questions are discussed in the text, infra. For discussion of the sources of Bracton's views and for elaborate citation to the principal authorities on medieval recusation practice see Schultz, A New A pproach to Bracton (1944) 2 SEMINAR (Catholic University) 41, 42-50, and particularly p. 45 n. 9.
14. "Aliguis non debet esse judex in propria causa." Co. LiTr. *141a. 15. "By the laws of England, also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and justices cannot be challenged For the law will not suppose the possibility of bias or favor in a judge. . . ." 3 BL. Comm. *361. This conclusion is sharply criticized in Sanborn v. [Vol. 56: 605
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The last-mentioned cases went too far, for if judges were disqualified as tax-payers some suits could scarcely be decided. Mindful of this difficulty Parliament in 1743 provided that taxpaying justices of the peace might sit in these local government cases. 10 Thus grew the modem rule of "necessity," that judges should not decline to sit where no substitute was readily available. As Pollock later expressed it, "the settled rule of law is that, although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may, but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise." 21 And this remains American practice. 2 ' A variant of "interest" is "relationship," the problem posed where a judge participates in a case involving his relative. Oddly enough, the English courts, over-influenced by Coke, early held that a judge was not disqualified by relationship, but that a jury was. 22 In the latter connection, courts were faced with deciding what degree of relationship necessitated disqualification, a problem which in its modem context remains as perplexing today as it was then. As was noted in 1572, "all the inhabitants of the earth are descended from Adam and Eve, and so are cousins of one another," but "the further removed blood is, the more cool it is." The line was drawn in that case at the ninth degree. In short, English common law practice at the time of the establishment of the American court system was simple in the extreme. Judges Rep The contemporary disqualification practice of both federal and state courts is broader than that of the common law. Not only has the principle of pecuniary interest been extended to keep pace with changing economic institutions, but relationship between judge and litigant,and a variety of other types of judicial bias have been prohibited in modern practice by the common law. 24 Expansion of common law concepts has been brought about in the federal appellate courts, where no statute controls, largely through the exercise of their own discretion. In the Supreme Court disqualification has always been the prerogative of each individual Justice, and prior to the Jewell Ridge incident no member of the Court has ever pronounced public judgment on the practice of another. 5 From the beginning the practice seems to have been founded upon a mixture of common law notions, individual judgments of propriety, and practicability. While statutes do not explicitly apply to Supreme Court practice, the impulse of individual justices has generally been to'adopt their principles."
State judges have more often been subjected to limitations imposed by statute. In this respect older states have generally adhered fairly closely to the common law with only slight doctrinal and statutory variations. Newer states, on the other hand, have tended to adopt elaborate codes which fall into three categories: (1) disqualification for specified grounds in addition to those recognized at common law; 21 (2) mandatory change of venue statutes, themselves of several distinct types, which often supplement the first method listed; 28 and (3) (1943) . The Inquiry shows that in almost all courts, disqualification in doubtful cases is at least informally discussed with other judges.
26. "I think there is no statute which excludes a Supreme Court Justice from sitting even in these cases, but statutes would have prevented a district judge, and I think also a circuit court of appeals judge sitting in these cases under like conditions. "And it has always seemed to the Court that when a district judge could not sit in a case because of his previous association with it, or a circuit court of appeals judge, it was our manifest duty to take the same position. Where the judge has an interest other than direct ownership the issue becomes the remoteness of the interest. For example, where a judge is executor of an estate owning shares in a corporation appearing before him, is the interest so remote as to make disqualification unnecessary? 3 Analogous problems are presented where the judge is a creditor 14 or guardian 31 of a party; where his political career may be affected by an election fraud case; 11 where he is an officer of a corporation defending or prosecuting the action; 11 and where a relative from whom he may inherit is a shareholder in a corporate litigant." 8 While disagreement as to the danger of judicial prejudice is understandable in the foregoing situations, the reasoning of the court which refused to disqualify a judge in a case against a cemetery corporation merely because his relatives were buried on its property seems incontrovertible. 39 The interest problem frequently recurs in cases where the outcome may slightly affect taxes or utility rates in the judge's home community. Under common law, as noted above, that circumstance would disqualify. But today such an interest is considered too remote to justify application of the principle, and courts have generally rejected the strict common law doctrine." 42 decided the same year-. Relationship. The relationship cases present two distinct problemsthat of the party relative and that of the attorney relative. Where it is the litigant who is a kinsman the proximity of the relationship is the decisive factor in determining whether disqualification is necessary. Brothers, uncles and cousins merely begin the possibilities, for the judge's relatives by marriage may also appear as parties. The English view that judges might hear cases brought by relatives was quickly abandoned in America by statute, but these laws vary widely in prescribing the degree of relationship necessary to exclude a judge from hearirg a case. attorney, rather than the party, is the possible object of nepotism. In a substantial number of jurisdictions the relationship of the attorney is not per se grounds for disqualification. The common law admitted of no such disqualification, and statutes frequently confine disqualification to cases in which the parties are related. In most jurisdictions, therefore, a judge need not disqualify himself unless the attorney can be considered a "party."
The question of whether or not the attorney is a "party" is often, but not always, 44 made to depend on whether or not he receives a contingent fee. If he does, or if his fee is set by the court, the judicial relative is disqualified in many jurisdictions.4 The opposite result is usual where the fee is not contingent . The disqualification may also be stated in the most general terms, as "connected with him by affinity or consanguinity" without specification of a degree, Miss. The problem of attorney relationship is further refined by introducing a distinction between cases where the relative personally participates and those where he is merely associated with a law firm appearing before the judge. The latter situation was recently denied as ground for a retrial by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the theory that the trial judge had in no way abused his statutory discretion. The Court, however, noted that the question had not been raised until after the trial had been in progress for nine days, and remarked that the judge would doubtless have disqualified himself had he sooner been aware of the plaintiff's objection to his sitting. 43 There is an increasing tendency in the Supreme Court for Justices to disqualify themselves in cases argued by relatives. Solicitor General Hughes resigned when his father took office and Chief Justice Stone would hear argument by his son only upon the consent of the parties. 42 Nineteenth century practice appears to have been less strict. Apparentiy no objections were made to the practice of Justices Curtis 1 and Field "' who, on various occasions, sat in cases presented by their respective brothers. Similarly, Justice Miller heard his brother-in-law and close friend, W. P. Ballinger, in at least two cases. 52 It is quite possible that at least in those jurisdictions where judges in the first volume of his own reports: "The Reporter avails himself of this opportunity to tender his professional services, in arguing causes before the Supreme Court.... The daily presence of the Reporter in court will ensure his attention to any cases that may be confided to him." 1 How. v (U. S. 1843-T. & J. W. Johnson, pub., Phila.; not in other editions). As further example of changing notions of propriety, compare Mr. Justice Jack-son's participation in the Nuremberg Trial with Chief Justice Stone's refusal, as incompatible with his responsibilities as a Justice, to accept the chairmanship of an atomic energy commission. Stone said, "As I am already committed to the former, it is clear to me that I could not rightly undertake the latter." Letter, Stone to Senator Vandenberg, 91 Co\.G. REc. 8951 (1945 are plentiful and cases may be conveniently transferred from one docket to another the attorney-judge relationship will be increasingly considered a basis for disqualification. Opinions of New York Bar Associations, 53 The A. B. A. Canon 13, to which reference was made, forbids judges to sit where a near relative is a party, and provides further that "he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position, or influence of any party or other person." common law principles. Despite Blackstone's denial that bias could exist as a ground for disqualification a more recent humility has prompted recognition that human judges may deny justice not only for profit or to benefit a kinsman, but for less tangible prejudices for or against a party, a lawyer, or a cause.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emics, CANONS OF JUDICIAL
Although in many states a party cannot charge "bias" and thereby have another judge assigned to hear a case,r" the development is toward that end in the trial courts. This tendency is exemplified by the increasing popularity of two basic statutory devices. The first is an extension of the usual statutory grounds for disqualification to include additional situation § where, in the opinion of the legislature, a likelihood of judicial partiality exists. The second is in the form of disqualification by affidavit, which amounts simply to mandatory change of venue at the request of either party. Affidavit statutes sometimes require the party requesting the change to establish grounds indicating bias, while in others a simple affidavit without supporting evidence is sufficient to effect a transfer of the case.1 7 Although some affidavit "statutes have been held unconstitutional as encroachments upon judicial power, 1 8 they are generally accepted without question. 1 The more significant situations involving possibility of judicial' bias may, for convenience of analysis, be classified into those arising from the judge's "attorney contacts," his "party contacts" and his "government contacts." 60 Although the judge's relationship with his former law partners is logically a part of the first category, the public interest stim- ['Col. 56:605 ulated by the Jackson-Black controversy has made its separate consideration in a later section seem desirable.
A judge, of course, is often closely associated with attorneys not in the ex-partner class. Close friendships formed at the bar with other practitioners naturally outlive elevation to the bench.6 1 And, presumably, if the ex-practitioner judge is intimate with former partners, the ex-teacher judge is equally intimate with former faculty colleagues. The ex-law clerk occupies a position not unlike that of the former junior associate, and an even closer association is found where a judge resigns from the bench and later appears before his former judicial colleagues.
None of these grounds, however, is usually considered sufficient to warrant disqualification. For example, Justice Frankfurter does not disqualify himself When his former Harvard colleague and good friend, Paul Freund is of counsel, 6 2 nor does Justice Douglas decline to sit when he finds the names of his old Yale associates Thurman Arnold, Abe Fortas, and Walton Hamilton on briefs.1 3 Moreover, Justice Rutledge has frequently heard oral arguments by Ralph Fuchs, a former associate at Washington University." Indeed, no one has ever suggested the desirability of disqualification in such instances.
In the United States Supreme Court ex-law clerks are barred from appearing before the Court for twvo years after they leave the employ of the Justices, a rule which suggests that the prejudicial effects of close association wear off rather quickly. 5 Few other courts limit in any way the practice of ex-law clerks. c "
The ex-judge may well be the most intimate with the court of any of the "ex's", for his association has been not merely with one judge but with the group. Thus on the theory that association breeds intimacy and intimacy breeds influence, argument by a former judge might disqualify an entire bench. But the notion has never been pushed to that extreme and in the United States Supreme Court, for example, exJustices Curtis, Campbell, and Hughes often appeared before their former colleagues. 7 The most difficult situation, and one which permits no rule of thumb, is disqualification in cases argued by an intimate personal friend. All judges have close friends at the bar, and perhaps on rare occasions a judge might be swayed in his decision by the presence of such a friend in court. Nevertheless the overwhelming American practice is against disqualification for this reason, although occasionally a judge does feel bound to disqualify himself. Judicial response to the Inquiry indicates that in almost half the states and federal circuits-there is occasional disqualification for the reason of intimate friendship with counsel. 8 It is, for example, well-known that Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals avoid sitting in cases presented by certain close friends.
A second possible source of bias is the judge's "party contact." The propriety of a judge's sitting on a case involving a former client seems to .depend upon whether or not the case in question was in his office prior to his going on the bench. When the judge has had prior contact with both the client and the case, disqualification is universal for the obvious, but seldom articulated, reason that a judge would seldom have an open mind under such circumstances, and to sit would invite charges of corruption." But where the judge's firm has been retained subsequent to his elevation to the bench a closer question is presented. Reference to current practice discloses a dominant view that judges should not disqualify under such circumstances, but it is reasonable to suppose that the practice in any given situation may One writer has suggested that when elective trial judges are turned out of office, they may have a very difficult time re-establishing themselves at the bar. To alleviate this condition he proposed that Cook County trial judges specialize in particular matters while on the bench so that the training thus acquired would give them a base for practice. Note, THE POSITION A judge's former "government contacts" present a third possibility of grounds for bias. The young lawyer with political ambitions follows a familiar path to fame: a prosecuting attorney to begin with, election to the legislature or Congress, perhaps a stopover in the executive branch of the state or federal government, and finally a judgeship. The present Supreme Court affords several examples. Chief Justice Vinson has served in both the executive and legislative branches of government. Justices Burton and Black were Senators, and Justices Reed, Murphy and Jackson have held executive positions, including variously the Solicitor Generalship and the Attorney Generalship. Justice Douglas headed the Securities and Exchange Commission, while Justice Frankfurter was once an assistant United States Attorney. Only Justice Rutledge held no previous federal non-judicial post. It is, of course, possible that any of these past experiences may influence the judge in a case involving personalities and problems with which he has had prior contact.
A judge might disqualify himself for bias because of his government 70. The Inquiry shows that disqualification is universal in cases which were in the judge's office when he left practice. Where the case involves a former client but the particular matter was not in the office when the judge went on the bench, the Inquiry shows that in about three-fourths of the State and Federal Courts, the judge does not disqualify.
The statutes are usually construed extremely strictly against disqualification. Blackburn v. Craufurd, 22 Md. 447 (1863) (judge could sit where only "some of" the issues were similar to those in his prior case as attorney); and see experience (1) if he participated personally as a government lawyer in the case under consideration; (2) if the case is presented by his former government associates; (3) if he participated in formulating the policy which the case involves; and (4) if he is a former legislator and the case involves construction of a statute he supported.
That the same man should not assume the roles of prosecutor and judge at different hearings of the same case needs hardly to be said. The impropriety is obvious, and prosecutors who become judges almost invariably disqualify themselves in these situations. The case of the Tennessee prosecutor who, after his election as trial judge, sat on the retrial of an action originally instituted by him is exceptional, and reversal in that casd was swift. 7 4 But there is no impropriety where the judge's role as prosecutor has been largely formal, as in the case of Attorneys General, who have only theoretical responsibility for minor cases in their departments. Thus, although the Schneiderman denaturalization case 11 was in the Department of Justice during Justice Murphy's tenure of office as Attorney General, he presumably had no direct connection with it and felt free to vote against the Department he had formerly headed. On the other hand, Justice Jackson, who succeeded Murphy as Attorney General, felt sufficiently involved in the same case to disqualify himself. But Justice Jackson, too, has, on other occasions, recognized that his previous contact with a matter was too slight to be prejudicial. Although as Attorney General he decided not to institute litigation concerning coverage of the insurance industry by the anti-trust laws, he nevertheless felt free to participate in the decision of a subsequent action on the subject begun by his successor, Mr. Biddle. 76 Supreme The ex-legislator as state judge may occasionally pause to consider whether he may interpret statutes he supported in his former capacity, but federal judges have no hesitation in participating under similar circumstances. s 0 An explanation for this divergency in practice may be found in the fact that federal judges are so regularly appointed from Congress that disqualification for this reason might paralyze the entire judicial machinery. Three members of the present Supreme Court are ex-congressmen, and 25 out of the 75 appointed prior to 1937 had served in the legislative branch."' So far as is known, Supreme Court Justices have never disqualified on this ground, and other federal judges have very seldom done so. State judges, on the other hand, are more nearly divided as to the proper practice. 'While this problem has not arisen in a majority of the states responding to the Inquiry, there is a variance of views in those in which it has.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the Supreme Court is less inclined to disqualification than some of the state courts. In an appreciable minority of states judges disqualify themselves if a case is presented by a former government associate, if a judge participated in formulating the policy involved in a case, or if a judge is a former mem- 80. In the Jewell Ridge case, the motion for rehearing on the ground that Mr. Justice Black was disqualified included as a ground in addition to his former association with Mr. Harris that Black had been Senator-sponsor of the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, this point has been given no subsequent attention. In one of the few cases on this or a related point, it was held that a judge who as an attorney had drafted the ordinance involved in a case was not disqualified. 
1947]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL ber of the legislature which passed a statute n6w presented for judicial consideration. Yet the Supreme Court practice appears invariably to the contrary. Similarly, no case is known in which a Supreme Court Justice has disqualified himself because an intimate friend presented the argument, although in almost half the states responding to the Inquiry at least occasional disqualification occurs for this reason.
Explanation for this discrepancy may be found in the impossibility of obtaining substitutes for Supreme Court Justices and the impoitance of having issues of national consequerce determined by the full Court whenever possible. If disqualification came too easily and Justices frequently declined to sit, the entire federal judicial machinery might be seriously handicapped.
Within the past five years three instances have arisen which serve to dramatize the result of numerous disqualifications. A statute provides that six Justices are required for a quorum of the Court,1 2 and in three recent cases (or groups of cases) disqualification by four Justices resulted in a loss of that quorum and made it impossible for the Court to act. 8 3 Since one of these cases was a crucial anti-trust case and another involved the constitutionality of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, a serious impasse resulted. Several bills were introduced in Congress attempting to solve the problem by reducing the quorum from six to five, by calling upon a retired Justice to sit in the emergency, or by some combination of these devices. 84 Congress, however, was unable to agree on any of these proposals, and the bill finally adopted disposed only of the antitrust case by referring it to the Second Circuit for decision. Chief Justice Stone broke the deadlock in the Holding Company case by withdrawing his disqualification, but the third case had to be dismissed for lack of a quorum. [Vol. 56: 605 tion 20, dating from 1792, permits disqualification, if requested by a party, on four separate grounds: (1) interest; (2) previous representation of a party; (3) prospective participation in the case as a material witness; and (4) relationship or connection with a party. But none of the above situations presents an absolute ground for disqualification.
A judge must disqualify himself only if circumstances will "render it improper, in his opinion" to sit, and his determination is reviewable, if at all, only for abuse of discretion.,'
Although for one hundred and twenty years Section 20 remained the only important federal law on disqualification s7 its operative effect was sharply confined by judicial construction. Direct reference was made to the English common law for definition of "interest," c and this rationale restrictively applied to new fact situations. 3 "Has been of counsel" was soon limited by addition of the phrase "in this case,"
and an attorney-client relationship prior to the case in dispute was never considered by itself sufficiently prejudicial to require disqualification." Disqualification of a judge on the ground that he was a material witness was confined to situations where the party could find no C. A. 7th, 1935) . In one of the wisest of the cases it was recognized that where a series of interrelated suits are pending and that a judge has a substantial interest in one of them, he should not sit in any. In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 Fed. 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) . 
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adequate substitute, 9 ' and the proximity of relationship required was held to be measured by the law of the state in which the court sat." 2 A statute so limited was not enough. The extreme discretion left in the trial judge, the narrow grounds for disqualification, and the complete lack of disqualification for bias were obvious shortcomings. Hence when the Judicial Code was under consideration in 1911, Representatives Cullop of Indiana and Sherley of Kentucky jointly persuaded Congress to add Section 21, the most significant federal disqualification statute now in force. Modeled directly upon the Indiana practice with which Cullop was familiar, and revised on the floor of the House, Section 21 was intended to fill the need for a federal change of venue statute."
Thus disqualification for bias and prejudice, excluded from the common law by Blackstone, finally found its way into the federal system in 1911. The statute provides that whenever a party files an affkdavit affirming that the trial judge has a "personal bias or prejudice" against him or in favor of the opposing party, a new judge shall be appointed in a specified manner. The affidavit, however, must state facts and ressons to substantiate the belief that prejudice exists, and it must carry a certificate of counsel that it is made in good faith. A party is limited to one affidavit in a case and must file it within a prescribed time.
The most serious question arising under the new statute was whether the trial judge 14 should pass upon the truth of the charges against his own qualification, or should automatically disqualify himself when the affidavit raising the issue complied with the statutory requirements. Initial doubts as to whether the statute was to be broadly or narrowly construed 11 were set at rest by .Berger v. United States. 0 The defendants in that case, charged with espionage, alleged that District Judge Landis was so biased against German-Americans as to preclude possibility of a fair trial. Judge Landis' phrase that "One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this country" 91 lent considerable support to the claim. A majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge could do no more than make sure that the affidavit was "legally sufficient," in compliance with the statute, and that its factual assertions were not frivolous. Under no circumstances, the Court continued, should the trial judge pass on the truth or falsity of the charges; perjury statutes and disbarment proceedings were sufficient safeguards against abuse of the privilege.
The Berger decision, therefore, gave full breadth to the legislative intent behind the statute. Indeed, one may be more than a little shocked by the realization that for over a century of our history there was no statute which would make such evident bias a ground for judicial disqualification. But the clear Berger decision, the clear statute, and its clear legislative history have not been followed in practice, and federal trial practice still does not provide a litigant with the automatic change of venue to which he is apparently entitled upon filing an affidavit in good faith.
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow construction of the phrase "bias and prejudice." Affidavits are found not "legally sufficient" on the ground that the specific acts mentioned do not in fact indicate "bias and prejudice," a reasoning which emasculates the Berger decision by transferring the point of conflict. While lower courts do not assess the truth or falsity of the charge, a similar result is reached by holding that even if the facts stated are true, no "prejudice" is shown.
Examples of such evasion are numerous." In a bankruptcy proceeding an affidavit was filed by the protective committee charging judicial bias in favor of the General Electric Company, which had made a conditional sale to the debtor. That the judge desired continuation of electric lines so as to prevent disaffirmance of the sale was supported by evidence that he had told the trustee he would not allow the Committee's petition to set aside the sale; that he had requested the trustee not to testify; and that he had turned over documentary evidence relating to the petition to an officer of the General Electric Company without the knowledge or consent of the committee. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held per curiam that the "District Judge satisfactorily explains" his action and had committed no sin but that of "indiscreet expressions," and hence was not disqualified." Another case held in-sufficient an affidavit which charged that a party had manipulated matters .to have a case tried before a particular judge who had been given financial opportunities by an associate of the party. 10 0 Similarly, a judge alleged to have "expressed himself in condemnatory terms of affiant" searched the evidence and concluded that the statement made could not "by any stretch of the imagination be considered as giving any evidence of any personal feeling on the part of the court toward the affiant." Although he disqualified himself as a matter of discretion, he denied that he was compelled by the statute to do so. 1 0 1 An analysis of the cases leads to the conclusion that unless and until the Supreme Court gives new force and effect to the Berger decision the disqualification practice of federal district courts will remain sharply limited. 1 02 While Section 21 of the Judicial Code may appear to provide a federal change of venue statute, it has not in operation attained this result.
JUDGES AND EX-PARTNERS
Cases in which judges come into contact with former partners can be divided into those in which the case presented by a former partner was in the office at the time the judge left the firm, and those in which the case arose after the judge had severed his partnership connection. The Jewell Ridge case falls into the second category: portal-to-portal pay cases did not come to Justice Black's former partner until at least 16 years after dissolution of the partnership.
Judicial practice in both these situations is clear. Judges invariably disqualify themselves when the case was in the office prior to dissolution of the partnership; 103 otherwise it is the common practice to sit in cases argued by ex-partners. 102. Further limitations arise from interpretation of other passages of the statute. Hence the prejudice must be "personal" toward a party, and the extremest bias on a "legal issue," as neatly disassociated from a "party," is not a ground for disqualification. In this view, disqualification, some twenty-five hundred cases and si-xty articles, not a single instance has been found in which it is suggested that expartnership, by itself, should be a ground for disqualification. 1 1 Similarly, no mention of this basis is made by the American Bar Association in its code of judicial ethics.' If a judge is to be disqualified from hearing cases argued by a former partner, disqualification must be founded on the theory that the previous association creates an intimacy which causes the arguments of counsel to have excessive weight with the judge. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that it is almost impossible to draw any rational distinction between the relationship of a judge with a former partner and that with a former faculty colleague, a former government associate, a former law clerk, a former bench associate, or simply an old friend. As has been noted above, these relationships are almost never treated as grounds for disqualification.
The practice of Justice Holmes on the Massachusetts Supreme Court may be taken as one measure of the attitude of a sensitive jastice in his relations with ex-partners. A study of a dozen volumes of the Massachusetts reports picked at random from the period of Holmes' tenure shows that his principal legal associates before going on the bench, George Shattuck and IV. A. Munroe, 0 7 appeared before him no less than nine times." x During this period it seems to have been normal (1932) , where an ex-partner of the judge was to be a principal witness for a party on an issue of fact. The adversary party alleged that the testimony of the ex-partner would have undue weight, and also alleged that the trial judge was so prejudiced against her that he could not give a fair trial. Precedent in the Supreme Court would, therefore, seem to indicate that Justice Jackson's position in criticising his colleague is at best tenuous. But, says Justice Jackson in his letter to the Congressional Committees, there is an exception: "I pointed out that to imply approval of his sitting would put the Court, and especially the Chief Justice, in a most inconsistent position. At that very moment the Court was disabled from hearing an important case because Chief Justice Stone declined to sit for the reason that the case was being presented by his former law partners, although he had not been associated with them for many years (the North American Co. and SEC and SEC vs. Engineers Public Service Co.)." 120 Three years before, however, Chief Justice Stone had given his own public explanation of why he did not choose to participate in the North American case, and the reason he gave before the same Congressional Committee to which a copy of the Jackson letter was addressed was wholly different. According to his own statement the Chief Justice felt disqualified not because of a former relationship with North American's counsel but because North American itself was a former client of his.' After Congress refused to reduce the statutory quorum, the Chief Justice withdrew his disqualification and in fact did sit in the case. 2 , col. 6. 121. "In these cases, the disqualifications were due to one of two causes. As you know, we have a number of ex-Attorney Generals and an ex-Solicitor General on the Court, and in these particular cases, a number of members of the Court have had something more to do with the case than the mere pro forma relations which an
Attorney General often has with cases in the Department of Justice.
"In one of the cases, the North American Company case also, that company is an old client of the law firm of which I was formerly a member. As a youngster in the office, I ran errands for it. It was one of our important clients after I became a partner in the firm. It so happened, I think, that I never had any particular personal relations with that particular client, but you can readily understand how undesirable it would be for a member of the Supreme Court to sit in the case of the client of his former firm, even though his relations with the client had not been at all personal." Hebrings before House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 124. At another point the Chief Justice reiterated that the Court might lose its quorum because of the presence of a large number of ex-Department of Justice officials on the Bench and because "there is always the chance that a Justice who has been in active practice will have someone before him who has been a client. The practice of state supreme courts and federal circuit courts is substantially in accord with that of the Massachusetts court at the time of Holmes and of the United States Supreme Court. Although judges responding to the Inquiry without exception disqualified themselves when a former partner presented a case which was in the office on termination of the partnership, more than eighty percent of the state and federal courts reporting a Yes or No answer do not disqualify merely because the attorney in a case is a former partner.
CONCLUSION
So general a subject and one with so many facets as disqualification scarcely permits of any conclusion more rounded than the obvious one that the law grows apace. There is near unanimity of opinion among courts as to the major situations which require disqualification on the founding ground of interest; in the newer fields of relationship and bias there is somewhat more division. The fastest growth today is in con- The foregoing data was collected by Mr. Eustace Seligman, a former partner of Stone. Mr. Seligman adds the following comment: "It does not seem possible from the above list [of cases] to ascertain any consistent policy on Justice Stone's part. The explanation of why he participated in Cases I and 7 [the Sliosberg and Perkins cases] may be that oving to the large number of clients of Sullivan and Cromwell, Justice Stone did not know in these cases whether they had been clients of the firm at the time that he vas a member of it. However, there may have been other considerations present in his mind such as for example whether or not he himself had any personal relationship with the client while he had been a member of the firm, as to which facts cannot now be ascertained.
"Also in Case 6 [the Banque de France case] he appears to have followed a different and stricter rule than in the other cases." noted that the trend has turned toward more general disqualification. The whole series of distinctions based on presence or absence of a contingent fee would seem at best a little silly, a reduction of the Yes or No of disqualification to a level of grossness quite out of keeping with the real moral values involved; and the sooner law based on such distinctions disappears, the better.
On the momentarily spectacular problem of hearing ex-partners, there is little that need be said when the evidence is in. Justice Black heard an ex-partner twenty years after termination of the association. In so doing he seems to have done pretty much what all judges do. Not a case can be found to say him wrong, and over 80% of the state and federal judges responding to the Inquiry follow the same rule. Black's practice is at one with that of Justices Field, Harlan, Blatchford, Butler, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone. Indeed it is doubtful that any Supreme Court Justice has decided this question differently. Had Black disqualified, he would have departed from the traditions of 150 years.
APPENDIX Tim INQUIRY INTO CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE
IN studying disqualification in appellate courts, it should be apparent that wha judges do is a more real source of knowledge than what they say; for disqualification by appellate judges seldom calls for formal opinions. This is particularly true in matters of considerable delicacy of judgment, as in the case of the intimate friend as counsel where the decision concerning judicial conduct is unquestionably a matter of discretion.
To the end of determining what appellate judges actually do, the following Inquiry was submitted to the forty-eight state chief justices and to at least one judge-usually the senior circuit judge-of each federal court of appeals. Thirty-one state courts and eight of the eleven federal courts answered the Inquiry.
One point 'must be strongly emphasized in presenting the answers: these judges were asked, not for their opinions as to what might be desirable for others, but for their practice. The questions were presented deliberately to avoid asking the judge of one court what he thought about the practice of any other.
The Inquiry was circulated with the assurance that if any contributing judges desired that their reports be kept confidential, they would be so held by the Yale Law School Library for a twenty-year period. A very small proportion indicated that they preferred that their reports be kept confidential; and this proportion is so small that were their names omitted from listings it would be quite apparent which they were. In order to insure that their [Vol. 56: 605
